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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Vol. 68 WINTER, 1963-64 No. 2
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE REGISTER
OF WILLS
BY JOHN E. WALSH, JR.* AND DAVID M. JONES**
This Article is intended to describe and evaluate one of the most funda-
mental aspects of the jurisdiction and functions of the register of wills: the
determination of testamentary capacity.'
THE REGISTER OF WILLS AS A JUDGE
The register of wills is an elected official in each of the sixty-seven
counties of the Commonwealth. His jurisdiction and duties are prescribed by
various acts of the legislature 2 although they have been the subject of ex-
tensive construction and delineation by the orphans' courts of the various
counties and by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
The essentially statutory nature of the register's functions and their
scope has created among members of the Bar a general impression that the
register is an administrative official only. Notwithstanding his performance
of many administrative duties, the register performs many significant quasi-
judicial functions. Prior to the enactment of the Register of Wills Act of
195 1,3 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held-with sufficient frequency and
clarity that there could be no doubt as to the import of its words-that the
register of wills, as to matters concerning probate, was a judge whose deci-
* Register of Wills and Clerk of Orphans' Court, City of Philadelphia; B.S., 1933,
U.S. Naval Academy; LL.B., 1936, University of Pennsylvania Law School; senior
associate of the law firm of White and Williams, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
** A.B., 1956, Princeton University; LL.B., 1962, University of Pennsylvania
Law School; associated with Floyd D. Tompkins, Esq., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. This is the fifth in a series of articles by the authors treating various aspects of
the jurisdiction and functions of the Register of Wills in Pennsylvania. The other articles
were as follows: Lost Wills and the Register of Wills, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 450 (1963) ;
Copy Fair and the Register of Wills, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 311 (1963); Dependent Relative
Revocation, 67 DICK. L. REV. 275 (1963) ; and Testamentary Intent and the Register of
Wills, 34 PA. B.A.Q. 688 (1963).
2. Fiduciaries Act of 1949, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.101-.1401 (1950), as
amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.102-.1102 (Supp. 1962) ; Register of Wills Act
of 1951, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1840.101-.601 (Supp. 1962); Orphans' Court Act of
1951, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 2080.101-.801 (Supp. 1962).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1840.201 provides-
Within the county for which he has been elected or appointed, the register shall
have jurisdiction of the probate of wills, the grant of letters to a personal repre-
sentative, and any other matter as provided by law.
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sions were unimpeachable except on appeal. 4 This classic view has been re-
affirmed in decisions handed down subsequent to the enactment of the statute.5
The judicial role of the register is limited, however, to the extent that he has
been granted jurisdiction over matters of probate only. Nevertheless his
jurisdiction in this area is exclusive, 6 just as the authority to determine
questions concerning distribution in the administration of decedents' estates
is vested exclusively in the orphans' court.
7
The subject of this Article is one of those areas in which the function
of the register of wills as a "judge" is dominant. The determination of the
register whether an instrument offered for probate as the decedent's last will
and testament was predicated upon the essential element of testamentary
capacity will affect from the outset the character and course of the entire
estate administration-from the grant of letters to final distribution. Therefore,
a complete comprehension of the questions to be resolved, as well as the
considerations for their resolution, is indispensable if the register is to perform
this vital function soundly.
THE BASIC RULES OF LAW
1. The Wills Act of 1947
The statute provides:
WHO MAY MAKE A WILL.-(a) Persons Twenty-one or Older.
Any person of sound mind twenty-one years of age or older may by
will dispose of all his real and personal estate subject to payment of
debts and charges.
(b) Persons in Military Service and Mariners. Any person of sound
mind eighteen years of age or older and being in the Armed Forces
of the United States in active service at home or abroad, or being a
mariner on land or at sea, may by will dispose of all his real and
personal estate subject to payment of debts and charges. He may
thereafter revoke such will whether or not he is still in such service
or is a mariner.8
The requirements established by the statute clearly fall into two cate-
gories: (a) physical capacity and (b) mental capacity. The former involves,
for the most part, a mechanical application of the statute; the latter has
4. Szmahl's Estate, 335 Pa. 89, 6 A.2d 267 (1939); West v. Young, 332 Pa. 248,
2 A.2d 745 (1938) ; Sebik's Estate, 300 Pa. 45, 150 At. 101 (1930) ; McNichol's Estate,
282 Pa. 187, 127 Atl. 461 (1925).
5. Cole v. Wells, 406 Pa. 81, 177 A.2d 77 (1962) ; Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355,
93 A.2d 834 (1953) ; Mangold v. Neuman, 371 Pa. 496, 91 A.2d 904 (1952).
6. Martin Estate, 349 Pa. 255, 36 A.2d 786 (1944).
7. Rockett Will, 348 Pa. 445, 35 A.2d 303 (1944) ; Carson's Estate, 241 Pa. 177,
88 Ati. 311 (1913) ; Hegarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. 503 (1874).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.1 (Supp. 1962).
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historically been a difficult matter of case law which is considered in detail
herein.
(a) Physical Capacity
The determination whether a supposed testator has met the physical
requirements upon which testamentary capacity is predicated turns largely
upon considerations of age, marital status and gender, and place in society.
Age. The rule that a testator must be twenty-one years of age (or
eighteen in the case of servicemen and mariners) refers to the time of execu-
tion of -the will, and not to the date of death.9 The rule provokes interesting
questions concerning wills which were executed prior to the makers'
attaining majority, but which may have been validated by subsequent
events. For example, may a minor's will be validated through execution of
a post-minority codicil? It has been suggested that the execution of such a
codicil will effect a republication of the minor's will in the same fashion as
any other will. 10 If a minor's will has been probated in ignorance of its defect,
is the decree of probate forever open to contest? The sparse authority on this
question indicates that a challenge may be barred after two years, although the
point has not definitely been settled." May a minor's will be republished
orally after the maker has become an adult? This question also has not been
settled, but it has been suggested that the Wills Act does not forbid validation
by oral republication.'
2
The provisions of the act relating to minor servicemen and mariners have
not been, as yet, the subject of extensive construction although it has been
held that the term "active service" does not necessarily presuppose a formal
and declared state of war,'1 and the validating provisions appear not to
include testamentary writings made by persons serving in an armed forces
reserve status.14Mariners under twenty-one, it should be noted, are not subject
to a military service requirement, 15 and so long as they are seamen by pro-
fession, they may make valid wills even though not actually at sea. 16 The par-
ticular exception which favors minor servicemen and mariners has reference
9. BREGY, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES ACTS OF 1947, at 2002 (1949).
10. See SMITH & AKER, WILL DRAFTING IN PENNSYLVANIA § 2.1A (1958).
11. Stout v. Young, 217 Pa. 427, 66 Atl. 659 (1907). This case dealt with an action
of ejectment brought twenty-nine years after probate of an alleged minor's will; the
challenge to the title was barred on the ground that title had become settled after five
years under Pa. Laws 1856, § 7, at 532. The Register of Wills Act limits to two years the
time for appeal from a decree of probate. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1840.208 (Supp. 1962).
12. AKER, PROBATE AND INTERPRETATION OF WILLS § 3.3x (1962).
13. Morgan Estate, 4 Fid. Rep. 561 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1954).
14. SMITH & AKER, op. cit. supra note 10, § 2.4.
15. Ibid.
16. SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA JURISPRUDENCE, Intestacy and Wills § 93 (1956).
19641
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
only to the matter of age; in all other respects they are subject to the require-
ments of the Wills Act regardless of their situations in life.
Marital Status and Gender. The law has from time to time exhibited an
awkward facility for ignoring and complicating circumstances which might,
upon reflection, properly be the subjects of judicial notice. That women-it,
particular married women-are "persons" would seem quite evident as a
practical matter; but it was not until the enactment of the Wills Act of 1947
that the General Assembly recognized that fact to the extent that it could
legislatively be taken for granted. The Wills Act of 183317 (in its provisions
relating to her power to dispose of personalty) brought into the law the first
indications of the impending emancipation of the married woman. Devises
were later sanctioned-with limitations-by the Married Women's Property
Act of 1848.18 The Wills Act of 191719 accorded to the married womhan the
full status of a "person" who could make a valid will; the draftsmen recog-
nized a necessity for the statute expressly so to provide. 20 Finally, the Wills
Act of 1947 abolished all distinction between the testamentary capacity of
single and married women as well as references to the disabilities of the
latter. Hence, marital status and gender no longer have a practical effect on
one's capacity to make a valid will.
Place in Society. Frequently persons or classes of persons stand in peculiar
circumstances of which the law takes cognizance and for which special con-
sequences are prescribed. In the instant context, the treatment presently
accorded to certain classes of minors, and formerly to married women, has
been discussed heretofore. The Wills Act appears to make no distinctions
other than those mentioned, although it should be noted that the capacity of
an alien to make a will had earlier been established in separate legislation. 21
There appears to be no restriction on the capacity of a criminal to make a
will.2 2 Similarly, persons suffering from physical handicaps, such as deafness,
dumbness, or blindness may make valid dispositions of their property by will.23
(b) Mental Capacity
The determination whether a purported testator possessed the statutorily
required sound mind generally depends upon the facts of each case and upon
the particular mental or emotional defect urged in opposition to the admission
of the proferred writing to probate. The variety of defects which may render
17. Pa. Laws 1833, at 249.
18. Pa. Laws 1848, at 536.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 181 (1950).
20. The act permits any person "whether married or single" to make a will.
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 22-24 (1950).
22. AKER, op. cit. supra note 12, § 3.A.
23. SMITH & AKER, op. cit. supra note 10, § 2.1A.
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a mind "unsound" in the context of testamentary capacity is so vast that
these characteristics merit discussion seriatim. The bare and deceptively
simple wording of the statute has served as the foundation for the develop-
ment of an elaborate body of case law which, in the final analysis, provides
but limited assistance to the Register in his effort to evaluate and to pass
judgment upon the soundness-or testamentary capacity-of a human mind.
2. The Case Law
(a) Testamentary Capacity Defined
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has defined the nature of a sound
mind as follows:
A man of sound mind and disposing memory is one who has a
full and intelligent knowledge of the act that he is engaged in, a full
knowledge of the property he possesses, and an intelligent perception
and understanding of the disposition he desires to make of it, and of
the persons and objects he desires shall be the recipients of his
bounty.
2 4
(b) Areas of General Awareness
The .passage quoted specifies four areas of general awareness all of which
must be within the testator's range of mental capability at the time of execu-
tion of the will: the nature of his act, the extent of his property, the dispositive
plan, and his beneficiaries.
The Nature of His Act. The relevant inquiry is simply whether testator
knew what he was doing when he executed his will-did he "know, and under-
stand, the business in which he was engaged" ?25 It is difficult to consider this
requirement with any greater degree of preciseness or detail, and it is clear
that the question posed must be answered by the facts of each case on its own
merits.
The Extent of His Property. There is no requirement either that testator
make specific reference to his property or that he inventory it prior to making
his will. 26 In fact, where testator intends to dispose of all of his estate in favor
of one beneficiary, it is of virtually no significance that he had no knowledge
of the extent of his property.27 Nor will testator's capacity be jeopardized by
a casual statement that he had no property.2 8 The apparent laxity which is
evident from the foregoing discussion has no place, however, where testator's
24. Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa. 495, 502 (1882).
25. Snyder's Estate, 279 Pa. 63, 73, 123 Atl. 663, 666 (1924); McNitt's Estate, 229
Pa. 71, 73, 78 Atl. 32, 33 (1910).
26. Thompson v. Kyner, 65 Pa. 368 (1870) ; McMasters v. Blair, 29 Pa. 298 (1857).
27. Leisey's Estate, 280 Pa. 533, 124 AtI. 754 (1924) ; Kustus v. Hager, 269 Pa. 103,
112 Atl. 45 (1920).
28. Aggas v. Munnell, 302 Pa. 78, 152 Atl. 840 (1930).
1964]
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incomplete knowledge of his property is coupled with failures in other areas
of required awareness; the cumulative effect of these deficiencies is to negate
testamentary capacity.
29
The Dispositive Plan. Here, once again, the standard is vague. It has
been aid that, if the testator "indicates an intelligent understanding of the
disposition he desires to make" of his property, he has met this requirement.3 0
An analysis of this area of testator's mental awareness invariably leads into
a study of the "reasonableness" of the testamentary scheme, discussion of
which will be undertaken in full hereafter.
His Beneficiaries. The test is generally stated to be whether the testator
was aware of the natural objects of his bounty ;31 by this is meant a knowledge
of "those collaterals who, had he died intestate, would have been his heirs. '3 2
It has been held that a testator who did not recognize members of his own
family at the time of execution of his will did not possess testamentary
capacity. 33 Knowledge of one's relatives may not be a critical factor where
testator intends to give his entire estate to a stranger, 4 but this defect assumes
greater importance where it is coupled with failures in one or more of the
other prescribed areas of general awareness.3 5
(c) Degree of Awareness
There must, of course, be criteria by which it may be determined whether
the testator possessed a quantum of knowledge sufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of the areas of general awareness discussed heretofore. The register
cannot and, indeed, should not be allowed nor required to function without
definitive guides. It may be said, however, without jeopardy to accuracy that
there are no concrete and universally applicable criteria by which each and
every case can be judged. In this serious business of mind-probing, each case
is truly sui generis. Paradoxically, while authoritative criteria are necessary,
there can be no rigid standards for determining the capabilities and limita-
tions of the human mind. However, in a very general sense there are three
points of reference (which do not rise at all to the stature of criteria) deserving
of mention: the testator's capacity to conduct business, his capacity to make
gifts, and the reasonableness of his testamentary dispositions. A study of
29. Glesenkamp Will, 378 Pa. 635, 107 A.2d 731 (1954). In this case the testator
was also unaware of his relatives or the natural objects of his bounty.
30. Williams v. McCarroll, 374 Pa. 281, 97 A.2d 14 (1953) ; Ash Will, 351 Pa. 317,
41 A.2d 620 (1945) ; Tetlow's Estate, 269 Pa. 486, 112 Atl. 758 (1921).
31. E.g., Wilson v. Mitchell, 101 Pa. 495, 502 (1882).
32. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 33 Pa. 469 (1859).
33. Roche v. Wegge, 202 Pa. 169, 51 Atl. 738 (1902).
34. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 33 Pa. 469 (1859).
35. E.g., Glesenkamp Will, 378 Pa. 635, 107 A.2d 731 (1954). Here the testator did
not possess knowledge of his property.
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these points of reference really contributes more to a determinatien of what
does not constitute testamentary capacity than to a positive definition of its
meaning. They are important, because they are frequently (albeit incorrectly)
the springboards from which contestants to a will leap into litigation.
Capacity to Conduct Business. The fact that the testator was capable of
transacting ordinary business is strong evidence that he possessed testamentary
capacity ;36 on the other hand, it is certainly settled that an inability to transact
business does not prove incapacity, 37 because less capacity is required in the
execution of a will than for the conduct of business.38 Perhaps the reason for
this distinction is the lack of the competitive factor, which has no place in
the making of a will. However, the proponent of the will may have the burden
of coming forward with evidence to sustain testator's capacity where it
appears that testator had been mentally unable to transact business over an
extended period of time prior to execution. 39
Capacity To Make Gifts. The very sparse authority which has developed
in this area establishes that the capacity required to make a disposition by will
differs from that required for inter vivos gifts. 40 Therefore, it appears that
proof of donative incapacity will not negative testamentary capacity, although
it may be supposed that such proof will shift to the proponent the burden
of coming forward with evidence of capacity.
4'
Reasonableness. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has strongly
affirmed time and again that an unnatural or even harsh disposition of his
property does not by itself establish that testator lacked testamentary capacity;
the view is that he is entitled to his prejudices and may arrange his dispositive
plan accordingly. 42 Even where there is evidence of mental disturbance or
incompetency on the part of testator, however, the supreme court has
sustained a finding of testamentary capacity where the disposition was rea-
sonable or natural. 43 Thus, it appears to be the rule in Pennsylvania that an
unreasonable disposition alone will not negative capacity, although a reason-
36. Kline Will, 382 Pa. 395, 115 A.2d 364 (1955) ; Waldron's Estate, 275 Pa. 258,
119 AtI. 129 (1922) ; Doster's Estate, 271 Pa. 68, 113 At. 831 (1921).
37. Brennan's Estate, 312 Pa. 335, 168 Atl. 25 (1933).
38. Conway Will, 366 Pa. 641, 79 A.2d 208 (1951); Higbee Will, 365 Pa. 381, 75
A.2d 599 (1950) ; Sturgeon Will, 357 Pa. 75, 53 A.2d 139 (1947) ; Olshefski's Estate, 337
Pa. 420, 11 A.2d 487 (1940).
39. Hall Will, 402 Pa. 212, 166 A.2d 644 (1961) ; Cressman Estate, 346 Pa. 400, 31
A.2d 109 (1943).
40. Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58, 132 At. 786 (1926) ; Kustus v. Hager, 269 Pa.
103, 112 Ati. 45 (1920).
41. Cases cited note 39 supra.
42. Sommerville Estate, 406 Pa. 207, 177 A.2d 496 (1962) ; Kline Will, 382 Pa. 395,
115 A.2d 364 (1955) ; Johnson Will, 370 Pa. 125, 87 A.2d 188 (1952) ; Higbee Will, 365
Pa. 381, 75 A.2d 599 (1950) ; Brennan's Estate, 312 Pa. 335, 168 Atl. 25 (1933).
43. Williams v. McCarroll, 374 Pa. 281, 97 A.2d 14 (1953).
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able disposition will sustain it in the face of questionable evidence regarding
the other elements of testamentary capacity.
(d) Specific Mental Aberrations
In the usual case where testamentary capacity is challenged, some spe-
cific deficiency or idiosyncrasy is urged in support of the allegations made.
These may range from simple lapses of memory to insane delusions. A brief
discussion of the common deficiencies will bring into sharper focus the aspects
of individuality which characterize the cases arising in this area of probate
law.
Insanity. An adjudication of insanity44 or incompetency 45 negates testa-
mentary capacity, and places upon the proponent of the will the burden of
proving that the will was executed during a period of lucidity.46 A similar
result obtains upon satisfactory proof of general insanity (which may appear
in a variety of degrees, including imbecility47) without adjudication. 48 It should
be noted that an adjudication of insanity is prospective only 49 and that a will
may be valid even though the testator subsequently became insane 50 or was
so adjudicated. 5' On the other hand, it is not evidence of testamentary capacity
that no lunacy proceedings were ever instituted. 52
This register has had the experience probably not uncommon to other
registers, of having the family physician who testified that the decedent, who
executed a will in a hospital shortly before his death was incompetent to make
a will, confronted with the fact that on the day before the will was executed
he had accepted a check admittedly signed by the decedent in payment of his
fee. It is small wonder that the appellate courts are giving decreasing weight
to the opinion of experts in cases of this nature. It would appear better for
the practitioner to find evidence of "lucid intervals" from the testimony of
disinterested nurses or internes than that of attending physicians.
44. E.g., Brennan's Estate, 312 Pa. 335, 168 Atl. 25 (1933) ; Goss' Estate, 274 Pa.
278, 118 AtI. 26 (1922).
45. E.g., Mohler's Estate, 343 Pa. 299, 22 A.2d 680 (1941).
46. Insanity: e.g., Brennan's Estate, 312 Pa. 335, 168 Atl. 25 (1933) ; Goss Estate,
274 Pa. 278, 118 Atl. 26 (1922). Incompetency: e.g., Mohler's Estate, 343 Pa. 299, 22
A.2d 680 (1941) ; Duncan Will, 147 Pa. Super. 133, 23 A.2d 357 (1941).
47. E.g., Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. 342 (1871) ; Seiler's Estate, 14 Pa. Super. 504
(1900).
48. Sterrett's Estate, 300 Pa. 116, 150 Atl. 159 (1930) ; Hoopes's Estate, 174 Pa. 373,
34 Atl. 603 (1896).
49. Taylor's Estate, 316 Pa. 557, 175 Atl. 540 (1934) ; Owen's Appeal, 167 Pa. Super.
10, 74 A.2d 705 (1950).
50. Taylor's Estate, supra note 49; Mulholland's Estate, 217 Pa. 65, 65 Atl. 150
(1907).
5I. Mulholland's Estate, supra note 50; see Kish v. Bakaysa, 330 Pa. 533, 199 Atd.
321 (1938), where the will was executed nine days after testator had been adjudicated sane.
52. Reichenbach v. Ruddach, 127 Pa. 564, 18 Atd. 432 (1889).
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Insane Delusions. A delusion is an insane belief in the existence of
something which does not exist and which no rational person would believe
to exist, absent convincing evidence. 53 However, the mere occurrence of
delusions does not negate testamentary capacity, regardless of absurdity. The
testator may make a valid will despite his condition unless it is shown that
the delusion relates to one or more of the areas of general awareness discussed
at the outset of this Article and that the provisions of the will were influenced
by the delusion. 54 The most frequent manifestation of an insane delusion-
either real or alleged-is a change in the testator's feelings toward the con-
testing beneficiary who bears the burden of proving not only this changed
feeling and the delusion, but also the causal relationship between them. 5 The
supreme court has refused to extend the scope of the rule to cases where the
causal connection is not clearly established. 56
Eccentricities. Mere eccentricities reflecting a change of character may
indicate that the testator's mental faculties have been affected, 5 7 but the
presence of such idiosyncrasies of character does not per se constitute in-
sanity.58
Senility. Old age with its attendant weakness and illness, does not negate
testamentary capacity. 59 However, where the condition of the testator's mind
deteriorates to senile dementia (profound mental incapacity),60 testamentary
capacity does not exist.
61
Memory. Testator's memory is certainly relevant on the question of
whether he was competent in the areas of general awareness discussed here-
tofore. An impairment of memory is not fatal to testamentary capacity, as a
general rule; however, it becomes so where the failure is total or where it
extends to testator's immediate family or property.
62
Drunkenness and Drug Addiction. The extensive use of alcohol does not
of itself negate testamentary capacity. 63 Where the situation has become acute,
53. Sommerville Estate, 406 Pa. 207, 177 A.2d 496 (1962) ; Alexander's Estate, 246
Pa. 58, 91 Atl. 1042 (1914).
54. E.g., Duross Will, 395 Pa. 492, 150 A.2d 710 (1959) ; Guarantee Co. v. Heiden-
rich, 290 Pa. 249, 138 At. 764 (1927) ; Watmough's Estate, 258 Pa. 22, 101 Atl. 857
(1917) ; Gongaware v. Donehoo, 255 Pa. 502, 100 Atl. 264 (1917).
55. See generally AKER, PROBATE AND INTERPRETATION OF WILLS, § 3.3v (1962).
56. Sommerville Estate, 406 Pa. 207, 177 A.2d 496 (1962).
57. Boyd v. Boyd, 66 Pa. 283 (1870).
58. E.g., Conway Will, 366 Pa. 641, 79 A.2d 208 (1951); Higbee Will, 365 Pa. 381,
75 A.2d 599 (1950) ; Weber's Estate, 334 Pa. 216, 5 A.2d 550 (1939).
59. E.g., Farmer Will, 385 Pa. 486, 123 A.2d 630 (1956) ; Roberts Will, 373 Pa. 7,
94 A.2d 780 (1953) ; Johnson Will, 370 Pa. 125, 87 A.2d 188 (1952).
60. Guarantee Co. v. Waller, 240 Pa. 575, 88 Atl. 13 (1913).
61. Dichter Will, 354 Pa. 444, 47 A.2d 691 (1940) ; Timmes' Appeal, 237 Pa. 189, 85
At. 136 (1912) ; Morgan's Estate, 146 Pa. Super. 79, 22 A.2d 87 (1941).
62. See notes 25-35 supra and accompanying text.
63. DeMaio Will, 363 Pa. 559, 70 A.2d 339 (1950) ; Olshefski's Estate, 337 Pa. 420,
11 A.2d 487 (1940).
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however, the burden of going forward with evidence of capacity may shift to
the proponent of the will.6 4 The same rule applies to the use of drugs.
65
Other Aberrations. Numerous other unusual conditions of mind may
appear in varying degrees of seriousness. Among these may be listed extreme
grief or melancholy, family hatreds, prejudices, and delusions. Generally,
without clear proof that the condition in question is so severe as to impair
or negate testamentary capacity, the rule is that evidence of the existence
of the aberration, although admissible, is not sufficient to establish incapacity. 66
Summary. The foregoing illustrates the uniqueness which characterizes
will contests involving allegations of testamentary incapacity. The rules are
broad and general; the subject matter to which they are applicable appears
in many variations and degrees. A simple solution to the problem raised in
this area is further frustrated by the complex determinations of an evidentiary
nature which must be made, to which the present study now turns.
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
1. General
The sole point of time at which the existence of testamentary capacity is
a question of moment is the time of execution of the will.6 7 Therefore, evidence
of incapacity must relate to the time of execution in order to be relevant.68
However, evidence of incapacity near the time of execution is admissible,6 9
as is evidence of incapacity at the time when testator gave instructions to his
scrivener. 70 The importance of the moment of execution is most emphatically
illustrated by the rules relating to insanity which hold that, general insanity
or incompetency notwithstanding, a valid will may be executed during a
period of lucidity.7 1 Where the testator's testamentary capacity is challenged,
it is for the register to determine after hearing whether the will should be
probated.
72
64. Leckey v. Cunningham, 56 Pa. 370 (1867).
65. Kerr's Estate, 255 Pa. 399, 100 Atl. 127 (1917) (existence of capacity) ; Skrtic
Will, 379 Pa. 95, 108 A.2d 750 (1954) (burden of proof).
66. E.g., Weiss Will, 366 Pa. 456, 77 A.2d 422 (1951) (hatred of family) ; Stewart
Will, 354 Pa. 288, 47 A.2d 204 (1946) (grief and melancholy) ; Doster's Estate, 271 Pa.
68, 113 Atl. 831 (1921) (dislike of family) ; Smith's Estate, 250 Pa. 67, 95 AtI. 338 (1915)
(obscenity) ; Linton's Appeal, 104 Pa. 228 (1883) (nervous excitement and apprehension).
67. Guarantee Co. v. Heidenrich, 290 Pa. 249, 138 Atd. 764 (1927) ; Wertheimer's
Estate, 286 Pa. 155, 133 Atl. 144 (1926) ; see BREGY, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES
AcTs OF 1947, at 2002 (1949).
68. Williams v. McCarroll, 374 Pa. 281, 97 A.2d 14 (1953) ; Olshefski's Estate, 337
Pa. 420, 11 A.2d 487 (1940) ; Phillips's Estate, 299 Pa. 415, 149 Atl. 719 (1930).
69. E.g., Williams v. McCarroll, supra note 68. Aggas v. Munnell, 302 Pa. 78, 152
Atl. 840 (1930) ; Surface v. Bentz, 228 Pa. 610, 77 Atl. 922 (1910).
70. Phillips's Estate, 299 Pa. 415, 149 Atl. 719 (1930).
71. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
72. See notes 3-7 supra and accompanying text.
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At this point the writers feel it important to point out the absolute
necessity of the scrivener attorney having direct contact with the testator.
In several cases before him where the issues were undue influence and lack
of testamentary capacity this Register has been shocked to discover that the
attorneys had operated through intermediaries, in one case an officer of a
bank, in another the second wife of the decedent in opposition to the interests
of the children of a prior and long-lasting marriage of the decedent, and in
another, through one group of contesting children of the decedent. When the
resulting preferences were exposed in the will and the charges of undue
influence and lack of testamentary capacity were raised, the attorney-scrivener
was considerably embarrassed when through his testimony and that of others
it was disclosed that he had never seen the testator or discussed the terms
of the "will" with him. More than embarrassment may some day be the lot
of an attorney if the court takes the view that this practice is a violation of
Canon 35 of the Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association. Drinker
in his text Legal Ethics" takes the position that such conduct is a violation
of Canon 35.
It is advisable where there has been a history of mental infirmity or
institutionalization for mental illness and the patient later is given a clean
bill of mental health, to have a psychiatric examination made before another
will is executed. One of the authors did so in another jurisdiction and was
most happy to see the will offered for probate with the psychiatrist's report
of sanity attached. An anticipated fight on the part of the disappointed rela-
tives was avoided.
2. Presumptions and Burden of Proof
Under ordinary circumstances, every pers6n is presumed to be of sound
mind and to be otherwise capable of making a will.74 This recognized pre-
sumption places the burden of proof of incapacity upon the contestant,
75
absent compelling evidence of incapacity-such as adjudicated insanity or
incompetency-which places the burden of proving capacity upon the pro-
ponent. 76 The presumption of capacity is reinforced where the will was
drawn by decedent's lawyer and proved by subscribing witnesses,7 7 especially
so where these persons and an attending physician have testified as to
73. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 160 (1953).
74. Williams v. McCarroll, 374 Pa. 281, 97 A.2d 14 (1953) ; King's Estate, 369 Pa.
523, 87 A.2d 469 (1951).
75. Johnson Will, 370 Pa. 125, 87 A.2d 188 (1952) ; Higbee Will, 365 Pa. 381, 75
A.2d 599 (1950) ; Sturgeon's Will, 357 Pa. 75, 53 A.2d 139 (1947).
76. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 3-7 supra and accompanying text; SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA
JURISPRUDENCE, Intestacy and Wills § 100 (1956).
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capacity.78 In such cases lack of capacity must be established in a positive
manner by clear, strong, and compelling evidence.
79
3. Competency of Witnesses
An inquiry into testamentary capacity comes within an important excep-
tion to the so-called "dead-man" rule,80 with the consequence that all wit-
nesses are rendered competent to give testimony on that issue. The statute's
restrictive provisions relating to competency are expressly stated to be
applicable
unless the issue or inquiry be devisavit vel non, or be any other
issue or inquiry respecting the property of a deceased owner, and
the controversy be between parties respectively claiming such prop-
erty by devolution on the death of such owner, in which case all
persons shall be fully competent witnesses. 8'
4. The Nature and Quality of the Evidence
Exhibits. As may be expected, the will which is in dispute is admissible
into evidence; and where it makes a natural disposition of testator's estate, it
constitutes evidence of testamentary capacity.8 2 However, the will may also
be evidence of incapacity, most particularly where its provisions are contrary
to the disposition which from testator's own views, feelings, and intentions
would appear to be the most probable, natural, or expected.8 3 Although an
unnatural will, as has been observed, is some evidence of incapacity, it is to
be considered in connection with other evidence.8 4 Generally, the will is not
sufficient to raise a presumption of incapacity unless it is so unnatural or
irrational as to raise a presumption of insanity.
85
Prior wills are also admissible. Their value lies usually in the support
which they lend to the proponent's cause. Where comparison of the disputed
document with prior wills discloses a similarity of dispositive schemes, there
is a strong argument for the existence of capacity; on the other hand, unusual
exaggerated inconsistencies would seem to favor the contestant, although there
is no reason to believe that differences per se are signals of incapacity (because
78. Franz Will, 368 Pa. 618, 84 A.2d 292 (1951) ; Sturgeon Will, 357 Pa. 75, 53
A.2d 139 (1947).
79. Ibid. Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58, 132 Atl. 786 (1926).
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1950).
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 5(e) (1950).
82. Novicki v. O'Mara, 280 Pa. 411, 124 Atl. 672 (1924) ; Snyder's Estate, 279 Pa.
63, 123 Atl. 663 (1924).
83. Lawrence's Estate, 286 Pa. 58, 132 Atl. 786 (1926) ; Morgan's Estate, 219 Pa.
355, 68 Atl. 953 (1908).
84. Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. 342 (1871) ; Bitner v. Bitner, 65 Pa. 347 (1870).
85. See Johnson Will, 370 Pa. 125, 87 A.2d 188 (1952).
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change, to a greater or lesser degree, is the chief reason for the making of
a new will in any case).86
Declarations. Testator's declarations (as well as evidence of his behavior,
habits, and appearance) are admissible to show mental condition.87 The
probative value of such evidence may be questioned, however, where the
declarations were made at a time unreasonably remote from the date of
execution. s8
It is well settled in Pennsylvania that a beneficiary's declarations are
inadmissible in support of an allegation of incapacity, but the rule is limited
to cases where there is more than one beneficiary. 9 Where there is only one
beneficiary ° or where there is a joint interest among several beneficiaries, 91
such declarations are admissible. The distinction makes sense in that adverse
declarations by one of several beneficiaries clearly work to the prejudice of
the others while such declarations on the part of single or joint-interest
beneficiaries are admissible as against interest. It should be noted, however,
that where the declaration would normally be admissible under an exception
to the general rule, it will be excluded if self-serving in the sense that the
declarant will derive a greater benefit from intestacy than testacy.92 Finally,
where the declaration of a beneficiary is admissible under an exception to the
general rule, it makes no difference whether it was made before or after
execution of the will.
93
Adjudications. Although the point has been discussed at length here-
tofore, it does not seem superfluous to insert here a reminder that, in addition
to the foregoing declarations, certain other types of extrinsic evidence of
incapacity are admissible. Particular attention is called to adjudications of
insanity,94 incompetency,9 5 or drunkenness,9 6 which are generally admissible
to prove lack of capacity, although the prospective nature of such adjudications
negates their probative weight with regard to wills made prior thereto.9 7
Expert Testimony. It is now clear in Pennsylvania that the testimony of
86. See Lewis Will, 364 Pa. 225, 72 A.2d 80 (1950) ; Long Estate, 237 Pa. 149, 85
Atl. 90 (1912) ; Masseth v. Masseth, 213 Pa. 434, 62 Atl. 1076 (1906).
87. Herster v. Herster, 122 Pa. 239, 16 Ati. 342 (1888).
88. Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa. 216 (1867).
89. Yorke's Estate, 185 Pa. 61, 39 Atl. 119 (1898) ; Nussear v. Arnold, 13 S. & R.
323 (Pa. 1825).
90. See Nussear v. Arnold, supra note 89.
91. Hauberger v. Root, 6 W. & S. 431 (Pa. 1843).
92. Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa. 216 (1867).
93. Perret v. Perret, 184 Pa. 131, 39 Atl. 33 (1898) ; Hauberger v. Root, 6 W. & S.
431 (Pa. 1843).
94. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
95. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
96. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
97. Taylor's Estate, 316 Pa. 557, 175 Atl. 540 (1934) ; Owen's Appeal, 167 PA.
Super. 10, 74 Atl. 705 (1950).
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medical witnesses who have had occasion to observe the testator is entitled
to equal weight with that of the scrivener who was present at the execution
of the will, even though the medical witness may not have been present at
that moment.98 Note, however, that the controlling factor is not the witnesses'
extraordinary qualifications, specialties, or expertise, but rather their personal
opportunity actually to observe the testator. 99 The supreme court, however,
has taken pains in the cases100 to point out that they do not intend to depart
from the well-established rule that opinion testimony of medical experts is
of very little weight or value when opposed to factual evidence. Specifically
and emphatically, they have held that they have no intention of submitting
every man's will and the disposition of every man's property to a psychiatrist
to validate or invalidate where testamentary capacity has been attacked. In a
case in which the issue was whether or not the testator was suffering from
insane delusions, the court spurned the attempt of a psychiatrist to denominate
the testamentary scheme of a particular testator as the result of "psychosis"
and force the court to accept a conclusion that she suffered from insane
delusions so as to deprive the testator of the constitutional right to dispose
of her property as she pleased. The court commented that "psychosis" such
as may satisfy psychiatry as deviations from normal behavior may still not
satisfy the law of testamentary incapacity, which the court was not inclined
to change.
Opinion Testimony. A lay witness may, upon proper factual foundation,
express an opinion as to testator's sanity or insanity, 10 although this is not
so as to his opinion regarding testamentary capacity based on general reputa-
tion.10 2 Note, however, that a subscribing witness may, without a factual
foundation, express an opinion as to capacity.'
0 3
5. Summary
The evidentiary problems-which have been discussed briefly, to be sure
-in the proof or disproof of testamentary capacity comprise one more complex
factor contributing to the pervasive vagueness which characterizes the instant
area of the law. The register of wills, hearing a contest involving testamentary
capacity, suddenly is confronted with a myriad of important and controlling
distinctions, the significance and application of which may escape the unin-
formed. Difficult distinctions are involved with the following determinations,
98. Masciantonio Will, 392 Pa. 362, 141 A.2d 362 (1958).
99. Campo Estate, 23 D. & C.2d 1 (Orphans' Ct. 1960).
100. E.g., Sommerville Estate, 406 Pa. 207, 177 A.2d 496 (1962).
101. Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. 342 (1871).
102. Lawrencets Estate, 286 Pa. 58, 132 At. 786 (1926).




for example: the admissibility of beneficiaries' declarations on the issue of the
number of beneficiaries under the will, whether the medical witness observed
the testator and the weight to be accorded to his testimony, the inconsistencies
between prior wills and the contested paper and the weight to be accorded to
such inconsistencies, the "naturalness" of the will's dispositive scheme, the
remoteness of testator's declarations from the time of execution, and the
necessity or sufficiency of a factual foundation for the expression of a lay
opinion. The evidentiary rules are probably the clearest guides in the area
of the law presently under discussion; however, their unavoidable multiplicity
and refinement, although of immense assistance to the practiced register, may
prove a source of confusion to the novice. It is clear that, whether he be a
register or a litigant's attorney, the individual called upon to make decisions
under these rules of evidence must do more than familiarize himself with
them-he must master them.
CONCLUSIONS
It is a fundamental precept of the dogma of testamentary construction
that testator's intent is the "Pole Star.' 01 ° 4 Note, however, that one does not
reach the question of what the intent was until it has first been determined
that there was a will; and there can be no will unless the putative testator
had the capacity to make one.
To be sure, the question of testamentary capacity is raised in a relatively
small percentage of cases; nonetheless, the register of wills must master the
rules so as to determine soundly the controversies which do arise. It is not
necessary to review the many considerations which render this a most difficult
area for the register. Suffice it to say that there are countless varieties and
degrees of mental aberrations, each of which may well be classified differently
by different observers depending upon the various manifestations of the condi-
tion. The problem is complicated by the fact that the subject, at the point
where the register becomes involved, is dead. His words, his acts, his habits,
all come to the register as a matter of the witnesses' recollections and, perhaps,
disappointments and ill-feeling. (A careless or uninformed determination by
the register may have far-reaching effects to the prejudice of innocent living
parties, not to mention the memory of the deceased.)
It appears to this Register, after reviewing the body of law governing
the considerations intrinsic to the present study, that the requirements of
sound mind may be a bare concept-impossible of concrete expression or
definition. The cases seem to bear this out in the sense that they generally
turn upon questions of evidence, rather than substance.
The cases repeatedly demonstrate a judicial reluctance to become em-
104. Wright Estate, 380 Pa. 106, 110 A.2d 198 (1955).
19641
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
broiled in questions of reasonableness; in fact, it seems to this Register that
a testator's right to his personal prejudices renders an inquiry into reason-
ableness inappropriate for the courts. Reasonableness, as distinguished from
naturalness, should be of no judicial concern. The inquiry, after all, goes to
soundness of mind, rather than to the reasonableness of its functioning. In
the opinion of this Register, the provisions of the contested will at any event
should not be the sole evidence upon which a determination of incapacity
is based. There must be more evidence-extrinsic evidence, whether it be
medical or nonexpert-to support the contestant's position. Of course, this
reasoning may work an apparent hardship in the opposite extreme in that
it allows a will to be overturned, upon proof of incapacity, even though
its provisions may be "reasonable." Again, however, reasonableness should
not be the governing criterion, for the Wills Act does not speak of it. Rather
the statute requires sound mind; and this Register is of the firm opinion that
the reasonableness of a will is evidence neither of sound or unsound mind.
The presumption of sound mind and the corresponding burden upon
the contestant to rebut the presumption should be left undisturbed. The merit
of this rule can hardly be disputed. If sound mind were not the normal
condition, then the presumption might be shifted accordingly.
As to the competency of witnesses, this Register supports the rule which
allows all witnesses to testify regardless of interest. In the tenuous study of
mental condition, any relevant information may contribute to the necessary
determination; however, the register should be ever alert to the influence
of individual interests and prejudices upon testimony, although these should
be revealed upon cross-examination.
Finally, there is the matter of the relative weight of the fact and opinion
testimony of witnesses, depending upon their professional qualifications.
Certainly an opinion as to competency, when based upon a factual foundation,
should be given some weight, although it would seem that an expert medical
opinion thus expressed should have greater weight than that of the layman,
provided the expert actually observed the testator. Also entitled to consider-
able weight are the opinions of the attorney-scrivener and subscribing wit-
nesses who actually observed testator at the time of execution. So long as the
doctor, the lawyer, and the subscribing witnesses were present at the time
of execution, an opinion should be received without further factual foundation.
Of other witnesses, a factual foundation should be prerequisite to the expres-
sion of an opinion. Opinion-expert or lay-based upon hypothetical circum-
stances should be rejected.
It may be that the future will bring such improvements in the sciences
of the mind that rules will be formulated to govern the determination of
every conceivable class of case. In the meantime, the courts continue to
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struggle to develop rules which can be applied in today's context of limited
knowledge with a reasonable assurance that an equitable determination will
result in each case. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the several registers of
wills to master the rules of law-evidentiary and substantive-as their con-
tribution to a more definitive body of law.

